Disclosure Design under Information Avoidance
[pdf]
When people fear bad news, more information can make them less willing to learn. This paper studies how disclosure can be designed to preserve useful information while making learning less psychologically costly.
Ministerial Advice, with Murali Agastya
Should a chief minister hear from ministers separately, allow them to observe one another, or delegate authority to one of them? This paper studies advice from multiple experts, each privately informed about her own portfolio, and shows when full revelation is possible even without commitment or monetary transfers.
Self-Similar Beliefs in Games with Strategic Substitutes
[SSRN] [pdf]
Why do players’ beliefs often look like projections of their own choices? This paper argues that the pattern may instead come from players using their own types as a guide to the population. It shows that self-similar beliefs can be behaviorally indistinguishable from common beliefs when only aggregate action data are observed, but generate distinct testable implications in games with strong strategic substitution.
Revealed Types and Beliefs in Bayesian Games
Economic Theory, 81(3), 751–773, 2026.
Decision Making under Time Pressure
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 117, Article 103084, 2025.
Putting Yourself in Someone Else’s Shoes: Mirror-Image Mapping in Strategic Decision Making
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(1), 203–223, 2026.